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Summary 
This paper argues that the Jihadi culture of Fatah al-Islam is an appropriated and non-traditional 




The anthropology of Jihadism is a virtually non-existent field of research due to a number of 
reasons: the inherent danger of conducting fieldwork, the fear of misused data, the difficulties of 
neutrality and ethical debates within the anthropological community.1 The conspicuous absence of 
social anthropologists engaged in systematic studies on the community of Jihadi groups espousing 
their interpretation of Jihad has left the field to other disciplines. This is regrettable precisely 
because Jihadism at its core is a distinct cultural construct, meaning an artificial socio-cultural 
frame of reference. The acclaimed originality of the bearers and guardians of the only true Islam, 
personified by the Jihadis, is in need of some serious questioning. That culture matters is evident 
from the fierce battle being waged on a global scale by disparate Jihadi entities: in essence it is a 
deadly game of control of cultural symbols. 
 
According to the eminent Russian ethnographer Valery Tishkov, an insufficient number of 
anthropologists have studied armed conflict, and there remains a serious lack of reliable 
ethnographic data amid an ocean of political science texts and enlightening journalism. Tishkov’s 
own work on the conflict in Chechnya is an excellent argument for an expanded role for 
anthropologist to engage in this type of study.2 
 
Readers who expect a grand or holistic theory in which to insert the data gathered from fieldwork 
will be disappointed. To reduce detailed testimonies, often quite varied or contradictory, into ‘risk 
theory’, ‘roots of terrorism’ or such like would make a mockery of our informants’ time and 
hospitality. Moreover, searching for a great theoretical paradigm to interpret events in a specific 
Lebanese setting during a time of considerable upheaval would invariably lead to meaningless 
complexity reduction. Many of the following quotations speak for themselves and are in no need of 
any academic interference; raw data makes for tough reading. The devil lies in the detail, and the 
authors believe we actually came quite close to the devil. In deliberately distancing us from the 
obsession with the systemic level of explanation, we have reached the conclusion that the final 
word on Fatah al-Islam (FaI) is still far away: it is indeed an enigmatic Jihadi group. 
 
Social anthropology is uniquely positioned to extract a deeper understanding of militant movements 
and individuals through the tried and tested practice of fieldwork. But such a tool is not available to 
political scientists or psychologists who have taken the lead in terrorism studies, whether merited or 
not. The anthropological method of conducting fieldwork allows different types and levels of 
conclusions and should therefore be considered complementary to a political analysis, for instance. 
The data extracted from properly conducted fieldwork enables different views and interpretations of 
Jihadi actors and their perceived role in a wider struggle to defend Islam in times of crisis. An 
                                                 
1 A debate is currently raging within anthropological circles in the US scientific community. The essence of this particular exchange 
of views is directly related to American anthropologists working with DoD projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, known as the Human 
Terrain System. Regardless of one’s position on this project, the fact is that very few anthropologists have been involved in studies of 
Jihadism. 
2 Valery Tishkov (2004), Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
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example of the possibilities is Quintan Wiktorowicz’s seminal study of the British al-Muhajiroun, 
in which he applied an ethnographic approach to gain unique insights into the inner workings of a 
radical Islamist movement.3 
 
Having thus presented an abbreviated argument for the use of fieldwork in conducting Jihadi 
studies, the point of this article is to take a closer look at a specific Jihadi group, Fatah al-Islam, 
which made the international headlines in the summer of 2007 during a prolonged siege at the 
Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared, near Tripoli in northern Lebanon. In maintaining a 
rigorous and relatively narrow research agenda, defined by anthropological research themes, this 
Working Paper deals with one particular aspect of FaI. Through the on-site collection of data the 
idea was to portray FaI as culture in practice, and this perspective requires some elaboration. 
 
Methodology and Scope of Fieldwork 
 
The decision to conduct fieldwork among Palestinian refugees who managed to escape the siege of 
the Nahr el-Bared camp came about rather suddenly. While the individual members of the research 
team had been aware of renewed fighting in Lebanon since it had erupted on 20 May 2007, no one 
paid much attention to what at first glance appeared to be yet another round of Palestinian 
infighting.4 Several weeks passed before the combined intellectual capacity of the team finally 
realised that this particular battle was different from the other conflicts that have torn Lebanon apart 
over the past decades. 
 
Gradually, media reporting began to mention the presence of foreign fighters among FaI militants, 
particularly individuals with recent frontline experience in Iraq, and the presence of individuals 
from Western Europe. This development alerted the team members as it appeared possible that 
Lebanon had been placed at the crossroads between the raging Jihad in Iraq and the more subtle 
version developing in Western Europe. If the media stories, some of which were very doubtful, 
could be verified the situation could signify a new development in the global Jihad. If seasoned 
Jihadi veterans from Iraq had begun to gravitate to Lebanon to set up shop, then this clearly 
indicated that Lebanon was heading for serious trouble that was likely to have serious consequences 
for the region –and for Western Europe as well–. 
 
Other research commitments allowed only two weeks of pre-deployment preparation, which meant 
reading as much as possible and contacting colleagues who might be in the know about the 
situation. This activity resulted in the formulation of a very narrow research agenda to be carried 
out during one week’s intensive fieldwork in Beirut and around Tripoli. The purpose of the trip was 
to collect as many eyewitness accounts as possible to verify the convergence of different Jihadi 
actors in northern Lebanon. It was specifically the foreign element that attracted the research team’s 
interest. Many details have emerged about this specific aspect from the data collected, yet the 
complex analysis has been excluded from the present paper and left for a subsequent publication. 
 
With the systematic collection of data from informants in mind, a simple questionnaire was drawn 
up before departure. This single sheet formed the basis of a number of semi-structured interviews, 
and the questions formulated were deliberately kept in general terms so as not to interfere with the 
informants’ formulations of their answers. The questionnaire contained nine headings and 13 
additional follow-up questions to be used in the event an informant had extensive and detailed 
experiences to relay. 
 
General and Specific Fieldwork Considerations 
                                                 
3 Quintan Wiktorowicz (2005), Radical Islam Rising. Muslim Extremism in the West, Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland. 
4 The research team was made up of three social scientists, two social anthropologists and a psychologist, among them Michael 
Taarnby and Lars Hallundbaek, from the Danish Institute of International Studies, and John Horgan, from Penn State University. 
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Fieldwork in a war zone is obviously different in many aspects from the common range of chosen 
fieldwork localities. While physical security is of primary concern it is especially the context in 
which the fieldworker deliberately inserts himself which dictates the ground rules. The simple act 
of being there conducting interviews and collecting other forms of data makes it very difficult to 
maintain a professional distance from the research topic and especially from the informants 
themselves. However, again referencing Tishkov, journalists and scholars in a war zone are on the 
front lines, but not in the war, they are in the zone of conflict, but not in the conflict itself. While 
this may seem a trivial observation it makes all the difference on the ground. 
 
The most desired category of informants were, of course, FaI militants themselves. However, they 
were not available for interview for several reasons, either because they were still engaged in fierce 
fighting, had been killed or taken prisoner or were in hiding in sleeper cells across Lebanon. 
Moreover, as will be clearly illustrated in later sections, interviewing FaI militants was never an 
option as all members of the research team would very likely have been killed. 
 
Informants were grouped into two distinct categories, the first being Nahr al-Bared residents who 
were eyewitnesses and the second category a mix of security personnel, journalists, academics and 
others who could assist in providing contextual background information. In all, 21 structured 
interviews were carried out and recorded in accordance with the questionnaire with an additional 15 
un-recorded and more casual interviews taking place in Bedawi. This neighbouring refugee camp –
also located outside Tripoli– had sheltered thousands of civilians who fled Nahr al-Bared as 
fighting intensified. The second category involved about a dozen interviews and informal 
conversations. All informants were granted anonymity, which indeed was requested by a few, 
primarily due to the sensitivity of the research topic. 
 
All informants are positioned and embedded in their own culture, and their responses will 
invariably mirror their role within their very own context, since neutrality and clinical objectivity 
have no place or role in war zones. This argument must also be extended to anthropologists in the 
field, though it certainly dents their professional ethos. Informants look to terrorism experts who 
happen to drop by for explanations of complex issues, which have visibly wrecked their lives. It 
must be noted that several of the informants had been injured or lost close family members and 
relatives. 
 
We found that informants were generally articulate and to the point, carefully trying to reconstruct 
often traumatic experiences for our benefit. The imagery and terminology used by some was far 
beyond the scope of any report or analysis we have since encountered on the subject of FaI, but so 
much more insightful. Their testimonies vary considerably, which is only to be expected. Some left 
the camp a few days after fighting erupted, some were trapped for several weeks and a single 
informant stayed on voluntarily for six very long weeks. 
 
The different views and experiences are the result of informants being at different places at different 
times; there is no way they could all survive the ordeal with identical experiences. In spite of the 
different testimonies directly related to the informants time/space positioning there is considerable 
overlap and an identifiable frame of reference. The identification of this general frame of reference 
was the objective of the team –the accumulated experiences from living with FaI–. This collection 
of data allows for an analysis of FaI as culture in practice. 
 
Contrary to Tishkov’s argument, we do not believe that informants solely by being outside a 
politicised and emotionally charged local milieu will necessarily speak more freely or reflectively.5 
On the contrary, our experience is precisely the opposite, our informants were extremely keen for us 
to write the truth about what had happened, and moreover they did not attempt to interfere in or 
                                                 
5 Tishkov (2004), p. 4. 
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dictate our analytical process. Professional and personal integrity dictated that all informants would 
be met with the greatest degree of openness and honesty possible, and of course they wanted to 
know what we as foreigners and experts had to say about FaI. Hence, the fieldworker is invariably 
drawn into the conflict whether he likes it or not. 
 
Jihadism as Culture in Practice 
 
This paper argues that the Jihadi culture of FaI is an appropriated and non-traditional culture which 
must be defended at all costs by its followers precisely because it is an artificial entity. FaI 
resembles any other Salafi Jihadi group in the sense that the only viable frame of reference is 
similar Jihadi groups, and this self-contained universe produces self-reference and little else. The 
appropriated cultural identity of a Jihadi explains the at times absurd insistence and emphasis on 
details pertaining to cultural symbols of a largely superficial nature. The battle for control of these 
symbols became FaI’s centre of gravity as a militant group, allowing it to distinguish itself from 
mainstream society, to which it certainly did not belong, and from other militant Islamist groups as 
well. 
 
Jihadism does not have a religious, cultural or historical origin to draw on. It is an invention despite 
any insistence to the opposite.6 In drawing on an eclectic body of references to support the validity 
of its world-view and associated political projects it positions itself squarely within modernity. 
Being left to its own devices it can achieve a relative degree of stability, as occurred in the 1990s in 
the Afghan camps where the Mujahedin lived the lives of the holy warrior with no outside 
interference with their cultural construction. Both self-assuredness and doctrine are always put to a 
severe test once they break out of a closed circuit. Jihadi culture has turned out to be very difficult 
to sell to local populations, whether in Algeria, Iraq or, as in this case, Lebanon. 
 
The non-traditional origin of Jihadism makes it a highly unstable culture and vulnerable to attacks 
from the outside as well as internal confusion about what exactly it means. However, the most 
significant way of reinforcing the culture of Jihad, within as well as outside the group, is to keep up 
the appearance of being ‘Holier than Thou’, often in the most literal way. The acquired identity of a 
FaI militant positions the individual into an unorthodox frame of reference, drawing on very 
selective elements of Islam, especially the cult of Martyrdom. 
 
In order to describe FaI’s culture as it manifested itself during the first half of 2007, several 
different themes have been identified in this analysis. All are related to expressing a distinct cultural 
identity and they concern: ideology, religious perspectives, family values, social control 
mechanisms and symbolic and ritualistic behaviour. 
 
The themes identified here inevitably overlap, which is precisely the point of this analytical 
exercise. Jihadi culture reduced to its moving parts often makes little sense. The plethora of studies 
on, for instance, Jihadi interpretations of Islam by otherwise competent scholars versed in religious 
studies make for one-dimensional reading and analysis. The anthropological method of enquiry 
attempts to bridge this gap between what the militants say and what they actually do. Theology, to 
mention one discipline, will not advance our understanding of Jihadism in particular, but studies of 
contested theological interpretations will produce enhanced perspectives on what is at stake. 
 
Manifestations of Ideological and Religious Perceptions 
Coming to grips with a Salafi Jihadi group like FaI in order to describe it as culture in practice 
requires an understanding of its ideological foundation: what exactly does FaI stand for? This 
question is comparatively more difficult to answer in detail because similar Jihadi groups have 
                                                 
6 For references to Islamism and Jihadism as a non-traditional invention see, for instance: Olivier Roy (2002), Globalised Islam. The 
Search for a New Ummah, Hurst, London; Aziz al-Azmeh (1993), Islams and Modernities, Verso, London; and Gilles Kepel (2004), 
The War for Muslim Minds, Belknap Press. Cambridge. 
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issued a plethora of statements outlining their ideological foundations in considerable detail, most 
of all al-Qaeda. In 2006 and 2007 FaI provided very few written statements and gave even fewer 
interviews to the outside world.7 Even so, a few important clues can be derived from this minimal 
interaction with the world at large, and they certainly confirm the group as a highly secretive and 
introverted organisation. 
 
However, instead of dissecting the statements and speeches through a literary analysis, our 
anthropological inquiry dictates a different methodological approach. The point is to describe and 
understand how the thoughts, ideas and perspectives of this Jihadi group manifest themselves 
through the collective actions of its various members. It is about what they say, but also –ant this is 
of even greater importance– what they actually do as a consequence of their beliefs. 
 
Examining FaI’s ideology from this perspective required informants to describe how it surfaced and 
became identifiable. The interview data identified a single trajectory in terms of revealing FaI’s 
ideological perspectives over time. While there is no reason to believe that FaI changed its ideology 
over the months when it was present in Nahr al-Bared, instead the inhabitants gradually realised 
what type of ideology the group expounded. In the end they would be clearly identified by 
informants as hard-line Salafi Jihadis, especially through the practice of Takfir –declaring other 
Muslims unbelievers–. 
 
When the militants first entered Nahr al-Bared there was little effort in the field of propaganda. 
Flyers were handed out and a few public meetings were held, but nothing in the form of a 
systematic indoctrination campaign ever materialised. Thus the informants’ exposure to FaI’s 
ideological and religious perspectives came indirectly. Local Imams from Nahr al-Bared held a 
meeting with FaI after they had arrived and asked them why they had come. Nothing substantial 
materialised from that discussion as FaI leaders were secretive about their real purpose and an 
informant remembered that one Imam had told the local residents not to talk to FaI militants. 
 
Despite the Imam’s advice, interaction was unavoidable and often resulted in curious or nonsensical 
statements from FaI militants. For instance, during conversations they would claim to be Mujahedin 
and some militants were convinced they had arrived to fight Israeli or US troops. One informant 
thought this was quite hilarious and indicated that Israel was a few hundred kilometres due south 
and amicably indicated the right direction to the militant and specified that if he wanted to liberate 
Jerusalem he was in the wrong place. 
 
An appropriation of the Palestinian cause also manifested itself, in which militants acquired the 
self-defined and imposed role of defenders and saviours of Muslims. At the time, which was before 
fighting erupted, it was not specified exactly what type of Muslims were meant, but that would soon 
become very obvious to anyone caught up in the siege. However, from conversations with FaI 
militants it became quite clear that saving local Palestinian Sunni Muslims from the horrors of Shi’a 
rule was a priority.8 
 
There was indeed some sympathy towards FaI at the beginning, but that would gradually erode and 
eventually disappear entirely. The informants heard of the idea of an emirate to be established in 
northern Lebanon. This concept led to the establishment of a Shura council that issued religiously-
founded verdicts. The Shura council was headed by Shaker al-Absi, with senior FaI members 
occupying the remaining seats of the council. Apparently the militants truly believed in the 
imminent creation of an emirate. Women would kiss Absi’s hand in respect, as he was to be the 
Emir, or ruler of a Shari’a governed enclave in northern Lebanon. 
                                                 
7 Shaker al-Absi stated in an interview with the New York Times in March 2007 that FaI followed al-Qaeda’s ideology (see 
http://siteintelgroup.org/terrorismlibrary/charts_maps/charts_maps_1181682170.pdf). 
8 The anti-Shia element should not be underestimated in this regard and sectarian tensions have increased since the 2006 war with 
Israel (interview with Omar Bakri Mohammed, Beirut, 6 July 2007). 
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When the fighting began in May FaI justified fighting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) because 
they were not Muslims, so they could be killed. According to an informant a fatwa had been issued 
by the Shura council denouncing all Lebanese troops as apostates, a necessary requirement for the 
ensuing battle. This blatant exposure of a Takfiri component in the Salafi Jihadi ideology meant that 
anyone not on FaI’s side was fair game. As one informant commented: ‘you are either with them, or 
against them – to them there is only one true Islam’. Local residents who were confused about the 
nature of the fighting would ask the militants how they could fight other Muslims, an act considered 
a grave offence. The answer was simply: ‘it’s Jihad’. The leadership, personified in al-Absi, did not 
attempt to hide the ideological alignment with al-Qaeda, although he was careful to claim his 
independence from this most notorious organisation. FaI clearly identified with the global Salafi 
Jihadi movement although this was not always expressed in unequivocal terms. One informant who 
confessed his initial confusion simply stated that ‘it is a strange group with a strange project’. 
 
The general verdict of the informants on Fatah al-Islam’s shallow ideological foundation was 
summed up by a 28-year old man who managed to escape in late May. ‘They came prepared for 
war, that was all they were good for, and they didn’t bother to explain their future plans’. He was 
upheld by another informant who held a similar view: ‘they said they were peaceful, but their 
actions and the reality looked very different’. 
 
Religious Practice 
Relations between Nahr el-Bared inhabitants and FaI members concerning religious issues 
underwent significant changes over a period of about nine months. Initial curiosity was gradually 
replaced with scepticism, which would eventually turn into outright rejection and hostility and this 
downward slope at the religious level is worth some elaboration. 
 
Upon arrival in the camp, FaI militants were keen to cultivate an image of being pious and 
righteous Muslims and some of them actually tried to establish good relations with the host 
community. Quranic classes were set up for Nahr al-Bared children, which was a popular measure 
at the beginning as they had previously been unavailable. According to informants, militants 
constantly talked about Islam and would often invoke the language and imagery of martyrdom. 
Dying for their religion seemed an obsession. At the beginning they claimed to be defending local 
Sunnis from the Lebanese Shi’a who were seen as a direct political threat and moreover an apostate 
sect. This perspective apparently gained some local traction because it could serve as a 
counterbalance to the success enjoyed by Hezbollah after the 2006 war with Israel. 
 
At the mosque their alien rituals at prayer time attracted the attention of the local residents. Some 
FaI militants would insist that their form of worship was the only true way, while other militants 
kept strictly to themselves. The rituals practised were certainly not the traditional Palestinian way, 
this the informants could easily agree on. FaI militants displayed a strict prayer observance and 
never missed their daily prayers. However, differences in culturally defined rituals in themselves 
were insufficient to upset the local residents. Instead, what bothered them was the militants’ 
insistence that their way of believing and worshipping was the only acceptable form of Islam. 
 
Their fanatic Islamic belief manifested itself in several ways even before the fighting started. A 28-
year old informant said that ‘if you swore at God, they would kill you’. What at first was mistaken 
for religious conservatism, which in the Nahr al-Bared context was not a bad thing in itself, would 
gradually be seen as an abuse of Islam, which to the local residents was something entirely different 
and far more serious. Apparently indifferent to the cultural sensibilities of Nahr al-Bared residents, 
a burial ceremony was interrupted in the spring by angry FaI militants. One informant who was 
present at the burial described the obtrusive behaviour of the militants who said that the funeral rites 
were not just wrong but un-Islamic. This particular event would cause considerable bad blood 
between the two groups who were gradually –but surely– drifting apart. 
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Some locals signed up for FaI, mostly very young and poor, but left when they realised it involved 
terrorism and not the Islamic way. What from the outside might have appeared as a pious religious 
movement looked decidedly different from the inside. It is not known how many new militants 
were actually recruited, but the general impression of the informants was very few indeed. 
 
The Takfiri practice of labelling other Muslims as apostates would turn out to be a double-edged 
sword. FaI militants who had been very quick in denouncing any other form of Islam than their own 
would eventually be judged by their own behaviour. Informants were very clear in their verdict, 
returning the kuffar epithet to FaI: ‘they used religion as a cover, but this is not the real Islam. They 
applied their own rules on Islam and had their own interpretation of Haram and Halal’. The 
religiously inspired readiness to kill would similarly be judged accordingly: ‘they are not Muslims, 
because they (Muslims) don’t slaughter other Muslims’. Their defence of Islam –that is, their 
interpretation of Salafi Jihadism– meant that anyone not aligned with their religious persuasion 
could be labelled an apostate and as such could be killed. 
 
A handful of informants were upset by the group’s name, insisting that these militants had 
absolutely no relationship with Fatah (here referring to the PLO) or the Palestinian people, and 
certainly nothing to do with Islam. They were considered fanatics and madmen and the name 
represented a triple insult: ‘they were not really religious at all’. 
 
Consolidating an Acquired Jihadi Identity 
The unequivocal and deliberate separation from mainstream Palestinian society in Lebanon, indeed 
from Sunni Islam itself, resulted in the perpetual consolidation of an acquired identity as a member 
of FaI. Precisely because of its non-traditional aspects –not surprisingly claimed by FaI as the only 
acceptable and permissible tradition– the culture of Jihad was formulated and practiced in different 
ways. This Jihadi culture manifested itself at many different levels, although only three will be 
described here. They are related to social control in the community, especially concerning women 
and children, and the practice of symbolic and ritualistic behaviour. These examples of Jihadi 
culture in practice are by no means exhaustive, yet they serve the purpose of illustrating just how a 




Informants described how at first FaI militants made no use of threats or coercion, yet they 
managed to create the impression that they were everywhere. Individual members were very polite 
and treated people fairly according to a Nahr al-Bared resident. They did try to attract people to 
their cause, though with seemingly limited success. The militants, however, were extremely 
security conscious, they always moved around in pairs or small groups and carried concealed 
weapons. Most of the time they moved around at night, always very cautiously and on their guard. 
Several informants mentioned that they experienced indirect intimidation. They received strange 
looks or unfriendly gazes, and this was interpreted as a clear indication that these people were not to 
be trifled with. 
 
They acted calmly but generally did not like to socialise with the local population. Often they 
would only approach others to ask for directions, and even then communication broke down 
occasionally because of their unfamiliar Arabic dialects. The local coffee seller remembered that 
FaI members would buy a cup of coffee at his stall, but wouldn’t enter a conversation. This 
behaviour was considered strange and somewhat rude, as he expressed his frustration ‘not even 
small talk!’. Only a few had spoken to members of the FaI leadership, who kept to themselves. 
Other members would simply refer to Absi as the Emir in general terms without seeing much need 
for elaborating on this important and controversial issue. It would seem that the FaI leadership felt 
little need for reaching out to the local population. 
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Over time, presumably due to a combination of increased FaI strength and self-confidence and the 
rising scepticism of Nahr al-Bared inhabitants, more direct forms of social control and assertive 
behaviour occurred. During the first months and into the spring of 2007 relations began to 
deteriorate. One informant specified a certain episode in March as the turning point. A quarrel had 
erupted between this man and members of FaI, apparently over a rather trivial incident. But the 
situation got out of hand and a relation was shot and injured by FaI militants. From this point on 
they started to show their strength all over Nahr al-Bared and whenever there was a problem they 
quickly spread out to take up positions. In another incident a boy of about 12 was stopped because 
he wore his t-shirt with the sleeves rolled up, which was considered un-Islamic. FaI threatened to 
kill him if he ever did it again, and as a result of this encounter his elder brother told him to stay 
clear of the militants, they were too dangerous. More examples of how simple quarrels had 
degenerated into violence were described but also how FaI militants were relentless in their pursuit 
of real or imagined adultery. Considering the relatively conservative setting in northern Lebanon, 
FaI’s zeal and methods in eliminating immoral behaviour, especially between genders, were 
disproportionate in the eyes of the locals to the alleged cultural transgressions. 
 
When the fighting started in May, Nahr al-Bared’s inhabitants were encouraged to fight alongside 
FaI. While the latter appeared thrilled by the prospect of battle, very few locals –if any– took up the 
offer. A measure of the cultural distance between two parallel universes can be derived from a 
conversation between a 30-year old local and a FaI militant during the fighting. When asked what 
possible benefit could come from fighting the FaI militant answered ‘I have the key to paradise’. 
On several occasions informants would vehemently argue that FaI had executed several of its own 
members when treason was suspected. This decidedly firm view on social control could not be 
verified independently; however, in the minds of the locals, FaI militants were clearly capable of 
such ruthless behaviour even towards their own. 
 
Jihadi Perspectives on Family, Women and Children 
FaI’s peculiar views and behaviour towards women are another striking example of the ambiguous 
Islamic universe common to Salafi Jihadis. The testimonies collected present a clear division of 
women into two groups: FaI women and everyone else. The few female informants were 
unanimous in describing non-existent contacts with FaI members, as the local women never spoke 
to other women and would avoid eye contact. A few marriages were rumoured to have taken place 
between militants and girls from Nahr al-Bared, but none were confirmed. It seems likely though, 
that a few marriages did take place especially when generous financial rewards to the families are 
considered. 
 
In terms of family relations, most FaI members were quite young, and because of their age had not 
yet married and thus had no family to bring along. An older and smaller group did bring their 
families when they settled in Nahr al-Bared. As for their own women, they stayed at home and 
indoors most of the time. When they were sighted on the streets of Nahr al-Bared, they were always 
fully covered in the chador and a face mask and therefore easily recognisable. 
 
The FaI women trained in guerrilla and terrorist tactics. They were seen training with firearms on 
the shore close to the Samed area in the camp. When the fighting started in May, some FaI women 
took an active part. One informant described the strange sight of a female team on a motorcycle 
which consisted of a driver with an RPG providing close support fire, both clad in their chadors. 
Another informant saw them carry guns even before the fighting erupted and claimed to have seen 
female snipers as well. 
 
However, during the siege eyewitness accounts from Nahr al-Bared inhabitants who stayed in the 
camp for weeks stated that FaI members did not care about their own families, who were in a bad 
way and not looked after. The explanation offered by the militants was simply that God would 
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provide. To this group of informants the behaviour of FaI towards their women and children 
seemed indifferent and callous. It was incomprehensible to them why someone would deliberately 
neglect the needs of his ownfamily, especially under those circumstances. 
 
The superficial respect for women accorded by the Salafi Jihadi ideology can be summed up in a 
specific episode before the siege. At the LAF checkpoint women were sometimes searched, but FaI 
threatened to kill the soldiers as this behaviour was outrageous to their sensibilities. They were, 
however, restrained by the local Nahr al-Bared Imans who decided that the issue was no reason for 
bloodletting. 
 
Like the women, so the children can easily be divided into two distinct groups: those from FaI and 
the others. Local Palestinian children in Nahr al-Bared often had to pass through the Samed area of 
the camp, the FaI stronghold, and this traffic was used by the militants as an opportunity to attract 
new members and to extract intelligence. Several informants stated that FaI worked hard to attract 
local children, with good results, but eventually their parents stopped this contact because they were 
uneasy about FaI’s intentions. Some schoolchildren who were bribed with money and chocolate to 
participate in Islamic training, were later pulled out by their parents, especially when it was 
discovered that they were encouraged to identify traitors. Gradually, the residents would realise that 
in FaI’s eyes boys should be raised as Mujahedin, and that they scorned whatever children normally 
do. In an incident which occurred before the fighting, some boys were playing soccer on a 
playground in Nahr al-Bared when they were approached by three armed FaI militants who told 
them that they had to leave and never come back. And if they did, they would have to take part in 
military training, or else they would be shot. 
 
The children of FaI militants who settled in Nahr al-Bared were almost invisible at the camp. 
According to informants these children did not play, only displayed a Jihadi mentality and their 
lives were clearly being moulded to make them future Mujahedin. The frequent use of death threats 
towards the local children at Nahr al-Bared –as described in the incidents mentioned above– might 
be indicative of a much deeper and sinister view that regards children as expendable. An 
unconfirmed rumour which was circulating at the time of the fieldwork among refugees at Bedawi 
is particularly illuminating. On or around 2 June a girl of about eight years was seen walking 
towards a LAF checkpoint. As she approached the checkpoint an explosion followed and the child 
never returned. According to two informants a bomb strapped to the girl was detonated by remote 
control by a hidden FaI militant. 
 
Whether or not this story can be confirmed independently is perhaps less relevant in this context. 
The point of this alleged incident, which was described by two informants who were very insistent 
that the author took accurate notes, is the fact that by this time FaI had emerged as a group perfectly 
capable of child sacrifice. Interestingly, the informants barely bothered to pass on any form of 
moral judgement on the incident: their horror and disbelief spoke for themselves and they 
apparently felt no need to explain anything. 
 
The Symbolic Universe 
The consolidation of a distinct Jihadi identity at the symbolic level occurred in many different 
ways. In terms of their physical appearance, FaI militants certainly stood out from the crowd. One 
informant who was particularly disgusted by their strange looks likened them to prison inmates 
because of their long beards and dirty appearance. Some were dressed like Afghans while others 
were clad in black T-shirts and rolled-up trouser legs. The outward projection of a Jihadi image 
entails a number of distinctive trademarks, all of them present in some form in Nahr al-Bared. 
 
A 51-year old male resident of Nahr al-Bared described his first impression of FaI militants: ‘these 
people are not Palestinians, they had a different culture and traditions. Their ways of eating, 
cooking, clothing was alien’. The local residents were confused by the insistence on long unkempt 
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hair and beards, the veiling of women and such like. But the fact that many militants took their 
meals seated on the floor while eating with their hands was simply too much for a few informants 
who conceded that this was ridiculous (‘Palestinians are civilised, we know how to use a knife and 
fork when we eat!’). 
 
Salafi Jihadis interpret the Islamic prescriptions on the use of imagery in very strict terms and the 
effort to eradicate perceived idolatry was enforced in Nahr al-Bared as well. Posters of Palestinian 
martyrs were torn off the walls as they were labelled Jahiliyya, a sign of unbelief and ignorance of 
true Islam. The Palestinian flag was also removed and painted black to signify the colour of Jihad, 
the expression of Palestinian nationalistic sentiments again being interpreted as offensive by FaI. In 
both cases this deliberate campaign to destroy or desecrate important Palestinian symbols was 
greeted with disbelief. Only the fear of violent retribution restrained local residents from resisting 
this exceptionally offensive behaviour. 
 
The identity of FaI Jihadis became clearly visible in terms of their perspectives on Martyrdom 
which in this context can be narrowed down to the highly symbolic behaviour of dying in combat. 
Jihadi culture and its associated beliefs were directly translated into actual behaviour on the 
battlefield. Their style of fighting did not focus on the concept of victory or tactical gains in a 
conventional sense, but rather on staging their own deaths. Quite a few informants described how 
FaI militants would calmly stroll around the camp during the siege under intense artillery shelling 
by the LAF. Their aim was to die as martyrs and they displayed no fear at all; on the contrary, they 
seemed indifferent to the fighting around them. In the words of one informant, ‘they fight in their 
own way and they sought out danger to achieve martyrdom’. A fellow Nahr al-Bared resident 
described the difference between the LAF and FaI. The army fired wildly and indiscriminately 
while the militants casually moved around while killing efficiently. 
 
Another aspect of the deep-seated culture of martyrdom was the use of suicide bombers. Again, 
actual numbers differ, presumably as a result of the confusion of war, although a very well-placed 
informant specified that seven or eight FaI militants had blown themselves up. These martyrdom 
operations occurred during the first days of the fighting and most bombers were Saudi Arabian 
nationals. Wounded militants would beg to be allowed back into battle, sometimes in spite of 
serious injuries. One informant described seeing a FaI militant who had lost his hand, but went back 
into battle anyway. Another related how a militant who had been shot thrice in the leg continued 
fighting though he was obviously in severe pain. 
 
While willing to suffer themselves, they were certainly also capable on inflicting harm on their 
enemies, whom they despised for being infidels. The practice of Takfir, declaring someone an 
unbeliever, was to be expressed in highly symbolic and ritualistic behaviour during the fighting. A 
Fatwa issued by FaI’s Shura Council provided the legitimacy for dehumanising their enemies. In 
the words of one informant, ‘they were willing to do anything to the Lebanese soldiers’. According 
to informants at least a dozen FaI militants were seen carrying large knives, usually a very direct 
expression of the Jihadi willingness to slit the throat of their enemies. This practice of ritualistic 
slaughter was made evident on at least one occasion, testifying to the fact that knives were not 
merely for decorative purposes. On the night when the fighting broke out an army post was overrun 
by FaI militants who proceeded to kill all the soldiers. There are several different accounts 
concerning the number of victims and the manner in which they were despatched, but at least a 
handful had their throats slit. This ritualistic behaviour is known as zhabiha and is a reference to the 
slaughter of animals. This particular act is highly symbolic as it signifies the complete disregard for 




While the multitude of artefacts and rituals appropriated by the individual FaI militant might appear 
irrelevant or trivial, in combination they serve a very distinct and specific purpose. They are 
intended to signal and defend a specific identity, at all costs. This becomes a necessity, because the 
roots of this particular Jihadi identity are so shallow. While each detail appears trivial when viewed 
in isolation, in their entirety they take on a new and more sinister meaning. The proof of the 
significance of details, like table manners, lies in the willingness of the militants to kill or die in 
order to suppress other forms of cultural identity. 
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the culture of Jihadism in practice in a specific setting at 
a particular time.9 By doing so, three entities have been triangulated: the anthropological discipline, 
the method of conducting systematic fieldwork and the behaviour of the particular Jihadi group in 
question. The methodological and empirical dimensions of this survey have been emphasised, and 
as such, it represents nothing but a preliminary probing of a new way to approach studies on 
Jihadism. For an in-depth anthropological and culturally-oriented understanding of the processes by 
which Jihadi groups manifest themselves, one would obviously need to progress into the theoretical 
realms of cultural studies. This endeavour, however, would far exceed this paper’s format and 
limitations. 
 
Yet the authors venture to assert that qualitatively based field data like those derived from people 
having experienced prolonged encounters with FaI militants might indeed advance our 
understanding of FaI and other Jihadi groups. The current scarcity of fieldwork-derived data does 
not merit firm conclusions, though it can be assumed that the trajectory of emerging Jihadi cultures 
will follow identical patterns, at the very least in terms of shared symbols and rituals. 
 
This present case on Jihadi culture highlights a number of possibilities for the study of culture in 
practice. First, it identifies types of knowledge –otherwise unobtainable– through the generous 
participation of primary and secondary category informants. The level of detail makes it possible to 
portray a Jihadi culture from the inside and to reach different types of conclusions than what are 
currently the standard within Jihadi studies. However, it should be said once again that conducting 
fieldwork on this topic under the circumstances described is not free of problems. The link between 
reality and academia was decidedly political and violent in this context. Maintaining scholarly 
objectivity and ideological neutrality is the first casualty of war. 
 
In highlighting the boundaries of cultural identity, the present case of FaI has proved that even in a 
conservative milieu such as northern Lebanon, FaI stood out as a deranged sect. The jointly shared 
symbolic expressions of militants served to reinforce socialisation in a hostile environment, even 
before full-scale fighting erupted. Through the manipulation and subsequent control of religious 
symbols, rituals and interpretations it became quite clear to informants that this was indeed a deadly 
game. Perhaps the most telling verdict on the nature of FaI was offered by a 51-year old resident 
who escaped Nahr al-Bared after 25 days of fighting, having seen more than he cared for: ‘Fatah al-
Islam? They don’t love anyone’. 
                                                 
9 The authors wish to express their gratitude for the support and encouragement received from the Real Instituto Elcano in Madrid, 
especially professor Fernando Reinares, who provided valuable feedback. 
